我和僵尸有个约会
DPP’s ‘mobile-network disruption drill’ a political stunt, exposing its role as a troublemaker to cross-Straits peace: expert_我的网站
A | 从几年前的“风雨飘摇”，到今天的“意气风发”，意法半导体走出了令人印象深刻的逆袭足迹，而其“三箭齐发”的扩产动作背后，还蕴含着欧洲半导体产业复兴的“大战略”。
At 2:30 pm on Thursday, Taipei resident Michael Chou received a mobile alert, stating that due to "simulated air attack on communications infrastructure," mobile network access would be affected.
It turned out to be a mobile internet disruption drill in the northern part of the Taiwan island. As part of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities' "urban resilience drill," the exercise was designed to simulate scenarios of limited communication resources amid major disasters or wartime conditions and verify public‑service backup capabilities, according to Taiwan-based media.
Yet in the view of observers, this performative farce not only disrupts residents' daily lives, but also acts as a tool for DPP authorities to hype up crises and amplify cross‑Straits confrontation. It essentially serves their scheme of "seeking independence by force" and narrow‑minded electoral interests.
As reported by udn.com, the exercise ran from 2:30 pm to 3 pm. When the alert was triggered, local police diverted pedestrians and vehicles to the roadside and urged the public to take shelter indoors. With mobile network speeds throttled, most people at the site lost mobile internet access; many waited out the drill indoors with available Wi‑fi and passed the time by chatting or reading.
Chou told the Global Times that 4G and 5G connections were heavily throttled during the drill, though Wi‑Fi and text messaging still worked. Even so, the exercise has created real‑world inconveniences, disrupting takeout delivery, transport‑related ticketing and outdoor emergency rescue services.
Local legislator Ko Ju-chun from the Chinese Kuomintang party was also among those opposing the drill. He accused the DPP for abusing emergency alerts which only exposed the public to inconvenience. He noted that a genuine network‑resilience drill should focus on "how the public obtain information after networks go down," yet local people still had no clear idea how to respond in such circumstances, per Taiwan-based media.
"The so‑called mobile internet disruption drill has very limited practical combat value. And if a military conflict breaks out across the Taiwan Straits, the real‑world scenario would be far more complex than the DPP authorities have envisioned, with much higher costs to bear," Zhang Wensheng, a deputy dean and a professor at the Taiwan Research Institute at Xiamen University, told the Global Times.
"The DPP authorities want the drill to stoke tensions, drumming up public backing for its combative defense policies and higher military budgets. Yet it fears over‑hyping the specter of war would disrupt daily life and erode its popular support, hence this superficial, showpiece drill," said the expert.
According to Zhang, the DPP authorities also intend to test Taiwan residents' tolerance threshold. It seeks to observe whether the public will passively acquiesce or push back strongly, so as to assess the mobilization effect of its narratives of "resisting mainland to protect Taiwan" and "rejecting reunification by force."
Prior to the mobile internet disruption drill in northern parts of Taiwan island, seven counties and cities in the central Taiwan region held the same drill on Monday afternoon.
Many residents have questioned why the southern region was exempt. DPP officials claimed southern Taiwan had suffered real‑life communication outages in past years and that a drill in the southern part of the island scheduled to take place at 10 am, when the Stock Exchange of Taiwan region is open, could disrupt real-time stock transactions.
"This drill is utterly absurd," Chou said, "The DPP probably figures that if anything goes wrong in central and northern Taiwan, it does not matter, local mayors would take the blame."
Echoing Chou, Zhang said that the DPP authorities do not want drill‑related disruptions to harm their core support base in southern Taiwan, particularly Tainan and Kaohsiung. By contrast, jurisdictions across central and northern Taiwan include many areas ruled by the KMT, which are being used as test subjects for the exercise.
By striking a posture of "combat readiness," hyping up cross‑Straits confrontation and ramping up ideological mobilization, the DPP aims to serve its interests in the year‑end local elections, he added.
"However, voters always pay more attention to livelihoods, the economy and governance performance in local election. If DPP's political manipulation go too far, it will backfire," Zhang said. "The overwhelming majority of Taiwan compatriots refuse to become cannon‑fodder for secessionists."
The DPP authorities do not hesitate to use the well‑being of Taiwan residents and cross‑Straits peace and stability as bargaining chips for their own political interests, fully laying bare its true colors as a troublemaker, the expert warned.
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B | 01意法半导体的“翻身仗”意法半导体在碳化硅领域的垂直一体化动作已有“预告”，该公司技术、制造、质量及供应链总裁Orio Bellezza在今年的资本市场日上就对外透露，将进一步扩大在意大利卡塔尼亚和新加坡宏茂桥的前端制造产能，其试验产线已经能够小批量供应6英寸、8英寸碳化硅衬底，新的内部生产设施将于2023年亮相。（意法的目标是到2024年实现40%碳化硅衬底的内部供应）早在2019年宣布完成对碳化硅衬底制造商Norstel的全面收购后，意法半导体从碳化硅器件向上游衬底片的垂直一体化延申就已经是一张“明牌”，此前意法半导体衬底片相当比例来自于Wolfspeed（原Cree），在供应上显然不及内部生产更具弹性，也不利于碳化硅器件的设计、材料、工艺协同优化，更重要的是，随着Wolfspeed等厂商向下游器件领域加大投入，在碳化硅器件市场市占率第一的意法半导体也有必要在供应链上“多留一手”。事实上，此次意法半导体公告中也明确提到，卡塔尼亚项目是为了实现“内部和商业供应方之间的碳化硅衬底供应平衡”。
C | 在卡塔尼亚项目之外，意法半导体在意大利Agrate和法国Crolles布局的12英寸晶圆制造项目也正处于不同推进阶段，前者将与Tower合作建设，用于制造高端电源管理、混合信号、射频器件，而位于法国Crolles的项目则将与格芯（Global Foundries）进行深度合作，根据双方签署的谅解备忘录，Crolles新工厂将主要基于绝缘体上硅（FD-SOI）工艺平台，制程规划将覆盖至18纳米节点，工艺可能来自于三星技术授权，尤其值得注意的是，Orio Bellezza提供的演示资料中，意法半导体还将推出基于外部代工的FinFET和先进FD-SOI产品，FD-SOI先进制程节点被标注为10纳米，这或许代表着其战略合作伙伴格芯FDX工艺新的演进目标。
D | （演示资料中还标注了碳化硅器件向第四代、第五代的发展规划）总体而言，“三箭齐发”的意法半导体，展现出在逻辑、模拟、功率半导体市场全线出击的进取势头，预计新项目建成达产后，公司12英寸晶圆产能将实现翻番，大幅提高公司产品交付能力，并进一步巩固其在碳化硅市场的竞争优势。意法半导体今天的“意气风发”，体现出这家欧洲老牌半导体厂商的顽强生命力。短短几年前，意法还被外界目为“泥足巨人”，在手机芯片领域合并恩智浦业务、与爱立信合资等重注黯淡收场，后续冲击引发公司内部法、意两方股东关系紧张。未能搭上智能手机SoC大机遇的同时，随着IBM宣布收缩半导体制造业务，与其合作推进FD-SOI先进制程的意法也在制造技术发展上遭遇重挫，时任CEO Carlo Bozotti宣布不再投资开发1X纳米FD-SOI工艺，此举也宣告欧洲厂商退出了如火如荼的先进制程竞逐。在资本市场看来，此时的意法“缓慢而乏味”，在其竞争的大部分细分领域都是“长期的份额输家”，少有的亮点智能手机MEMS可能被苹果用新锐厂商替换，分立器件领域又面临中国厂商激烈的成本竞争，甚至有市场人士暗示，意法应当被谷歌收购，成为后者搭建半导体业务的“养料”。然而随着法国人Jean-Marc Chery接任CEO，意法半导体在2018年后打出了漂亮的“翻身仗”，其ToF传感器等新产品巩固乃至扩大了在高端智能手机中配套份额，而特斯拉在Model 3主逆变器中选用意法半导体碳化硅MOSFET，也将公司送上了车用功率器件的“风口”。03意法复兴的“大棋局”从目前布局看，在传统产品线之外，先进制程与宽禁带材料，是意法半导体未来两大投入重点。首先来看先进制程，意法半导体此次重启向1X纳米工艺节点的进军，明确选择了FD-SOI技术路线为突破重点。而在与格芯的产能合作之前，今年4月份，意法、格芯、Soitec、CEA-Leti就已经宣布组成技术联盟，合作推进下一代FD-SOI技术路线图和产业生态系统培育，比肩Imec的研究机构CEA-Leti展望称，FD-SOI可以扩展至10纳米乃至更小工艺节点。FD-SOI此前在与FinFET技术路线竞争中的失败，既有硅片成本过高等技术原因，也与推动这一技术发展的“Vendor”实力不足有相当大关系，此次FD-SOI技术迭代“重启”，则面对着更为有利的环境。一方面，FinFET在进入更低制程节点后，由于需要使用昂贵的EUV光刻设备，芯片制造成本大幅增加，相当程度上继承传统平面工艺，无需EUV的FD-SOI成本劣势缩小，另一方面，FD-SOI固有的漏电流性能优势，随着汽车、物联网和移动应用的勃兴得以进一步凸显。其次再看宽禁带材料，在垂直一体化的同时，意法半导体碳化硅MOS管也已经发展到了第三代，并可能通过沟槽结构进一步提高性能表现，而在另一热门材料氮化镓（GaN）领域，意法半导体位于法国图尔斯（Tours）的8英寸工厂预计将于2023年投入规模量产，并正在推进集成GaN、BCD工艺GaN等特色技术开发。值得特别强调的是，作为长期以来的欧洲芯片企业“一哥”，时至今日法意两国国有资本仍然在意法半导体享有大股东地位，今年7月法国总统马克龙亲自视察Crolles项目，并宣布向“10纳米技术节点”的研发资金支持，而卡塔尼亚碳化硅项目中，意大利政府同样为其申请了欧盟援助资金中2.925亿欧元的补贴，这样不同寻常的官方支持，使意法半导体近年来的布局方向，相当程度上也折射着欧洲半导体产业政策规划的思路。以先进制程为例，在欧洲2030年半导体产业规划中，对于FD-SOI已经表达了明确兴趣。欧盟委员会近期向欧盟理事会提交的《欧洲芯片法案》附件4（Annex 4）中，就专门针对FD-SOI与FinFET技术路线进行了详细分析，认为欧洲地区产业生态与技术基础，完全可以将FD-SOI推进至10纳米节点，与其后7纳米以下FinFET乃至GAA-FET工艺相衔接。
E | 欧盟对FD-SOI的“执念”背后，是其芯片产业“自主可控”的诉求，FD-SOI的大规模产业化，意味着开辟一个与FinFET可以相区别的先进逻辑芯片制造生态，欧洲本土企业无疑将是最大的获益者，也将大大有助于提升供应链上欧洲本土配套的比例。尽管美国目前极力拉拢欧盟，英特尔也信誓旦旦将在其投资的德国工厂上马最先进的GAA-FET工艺，但欧洲对先进FD-SOI技术步步为营的布局，依然透露出其战略规划层面的“清醒”。04结语重新“支棱”起来的意法半导体及其战略布局，为中国产业界也带来了有力的鼓舞和有益的镜鉴，对于后者而言，先进制程逻辑芯片制造面临着更为严峻的外部遏制压力，大陆产学研机构也有不少正在FD-SOI技术路线上默默耕耘，这条能够绕开EUV的“小路”，有必要得到更多企业更大力度的“平整”和“拓宽”。而在宽禁带材料领域，与眼花缭乱数十上百个国内碳化硅、氮化镓项目相比，刚刚着手建设欧洲首个6英寸碳化硅衬底量产工厂的意法半导体，在市场上却有着强劲许多的竞争力，在宣发融资的“热闹”背后，新赛道如何商业落地，需要国内企业更多思考。
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